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THE ATLANTIC COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commander in Chief Atlantic
To: Joint Chiefs of Staff (Copies 1-12)

Subj: Annual Historical Report of the Commander in Chief Atlantic

Ref: (a) JCS SM-408-59 of 17 April 1959

Encl: (1) Annual Historical Report of the Commander in Chief Atlantic for the Calendar Year 1962

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PART I

ADMINISTRATION

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1. Command Structure Changes

a. Headquarters, Joint Task Force 122 was disestablished and all functions were assumed by CINCLANT, effective 20 October 1962, in order to better exercise command and control of the build-up and necessary planning changes for Joint Contingency Operations incident to the outbreak of the Cuban crisis. ¹ ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

2. Staff Organization Changes

a. Joint War Room (J36) was established as a section of the Operations Division, as of 12 March 1962. ² ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

b. Subsidiary Activities Plans Section (J58) of the Plans Division was increased as of 17 August 1962. ³ ~~(SECRET)~~

c. Exercise Staff FALLEX-62 (013) was disestablished as of 31 October 1962.

d. U. S. Representative to SEA SPRAY (J015) was established as authorized by JCS on 9 January 1963. ⁴ ~~(SECRET)~~

3. Personnel Allowances and Manpower Authorizations

a. The currently effective personnel allowances and manpower authorizations for Headquarters activities are as follows:

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CINCLANT	102	59	161
CINCLANTFLT	119	10	129
CINCWESTLANT	14	10	24
FLTOPCONCENLANT	28	170	198
NAVSECGRUDET CINCLANTFLT	20	35	55
FAU HQ CINCLANTFLT	12	483	495
MARDET CINCLANTFLT	2	93	95
TOTAL	297	860	1157

b. All officers attached to CINCLANT Joint Staff for primary duty are as follows: USN - 61; USMC - 8; USA - 17; USAF - 16.

c. All officers attached to CINCWESTLANT Staff for primary duty are as follows: USN - 11; RN - 1; RCN - 1; RCAF - 1.

d. RADM John W. LEVERTON, Jr., USN relieved RADM Horacio RIVERO, USN on 12 October 1962 as Deputy Chief of Staff, CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/CINCWESTLANT.

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4. Augmentation for Cuban Crisis - 19 October - 10 December 1962

a. At the commencement of the Cuban crisis, the Headquarters Staff consisted of 285 officers and 591 enlisted, for a total of 876 personnel.

b. This Staff was augmented from the staffs of JTF-4, JTF-122, CINCSTRIKE, CONARC and LANTFLT Units as follows:

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
NAVY	40	132	172
ARMY	31	21	52
AIR FORCE	30	21	51
MARINE CORPS	12	1	13
TOTAL	<u>113</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>288</u>

c. In addition to augmentation personnel needed on the Headquarters Staff, it was necessary to augment the other supervisory, operational and planning staffs of Commanders in and adjacent to Cuba. Those most affected were the entire complex at Guantanamo Bay (including air fields, defense forces and logistic supply forces), the Naval Base and Naval Air Station at Key West, where air defense and air reconnaissance operations were being conducted on a concentrated scale. Accordingly, augmentation was as follows:

GUANTANAMO BAY

	<u>On board 19 October 1962</u>	<u>On board at peak</u>
NAVY	2500	3900*
MARINES	<u>650</u>	<u>5187</u>
TOTAL	<u>3150</u>	<u>9087</u>

*Includes 224 with Marine Forces.

Ground Defense Forces were placed under the command of BCEN W. R. Collins, USMC early in the period:

KEY WEST

	<u>On board 19 October 1962</u>	<u>On board at peak</u>
NAVY	8031	8878
MARINES	160	1631
AIR FORCE	134	1247
ARMY	----	793
TOTAL	<u>8325</u>	<u>12549</u>

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FOOTNOTES:

- 1 - CINCLANT msg 190712Z OCT 62
- 2 - JCS Memo SM-204-62 of 20 Feb 62
- 3 - JCS Memo SM-906-62 of 17 Aug 62
- 4 - JCS msg 8125 DTG 091424Z JAN 63

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PART IV

LOGISTICS

1. Fleet Maintenance and Funding (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

a. In 1962, the salient period was the Cuban crisis and the following events pertain in the areas of fleet maintenance and funding:

(1) On 22 October, as directed by CNO, arrangement was made for acceleration of shipyard availabilities of USS SARATOGA and USS LEXINGTON.

(2) During the period 25 October to 5 November, shipyard availabilities of USS CANBERRA, seven destroyers, three destroyer escorts, one landing ship dock and two mobile support ships were deferred.

(3) On 6 November, plans were completed for the funding and accounting aspects of providing logistic support to forces of Latin American countries participating in the operation.

(4) "New" money was not made available to CINCLANTFLT to finance the additional costs incident to the Cuban operation. However, the Bureau of Ships advanced Third and Fourth Quarter funds into the Second Quarter. Along with this advance of funds, a reporting requirement was established to report bi-weekly those additional costs allocable to the Cuban operation. These reports of "out-of-pocket" expenses will become the basis of back-up data for a supplemental appropriation to restore the Fourth Quarter fund availability.

(5) Based on guidance from NAVCOMPT, funding for support of the Latin American ships engaged in quarantine operations was resolved. These ships were supported out of the same budget projects funding U. S. Navy ships; costs were reported separately to isolate these "out-of-pocket" costs.

(6) Costs of the Cuban crisis with respect to CINCLANT monies totaled 9.6 million dollars.

2. Transportation (~~SECRET~~)

a. During the Cuban crisis in October it became apparent that transportation was the key factor in meeting the planned reaction time in CINCLANT Operation Plan 316-62 (Cuba). Two transportation areas of particular concern were:

(1) The capability of the Commander of the Military Sea Transportation Service to assemble the large number of transports and commercial cargo ships required to move Army and U. S. Marine Corps forces to the objective area within the planned reaction time.

(2) The increased requirement for amphibious type ships to provide the Army forces with a ready assault capability upon arrival in the objective area.

b. A study of the problem in paragraph a(1) revealed that the capability to reduce the reaction time below eighteen days (18) would require prepositioning of a number of transports and cargo ships proportional to the reduction in reaction time. Some MSTs nucleus fleet transports were held in CONUS ports; however, no commercial cargo ships were prepositioned.

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6. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) Operations ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

a. During the Cuban operation, it became apparent that NAS, Key West, Florida did not have sufficient on-base jet fuel storage to support the increased number of aircraft operating from NAS Key West because of the contingency. Necessary arrangements were made with the Defense Petroleum Supply Center and the U. S. Navy Fuel Supply Office to provide increased quantities of JP-4 fuel from the commercial contractor, and also to provide back-up storage in barges leased from commercial sources. Additionally, the USS NESPELEN was loaded with jet fuel JP-4 and sailed from Norfolk as back-up support for NAS Key West.

b. During the same period arrangements were made with DPSC and MSTs to provide tanker augmentation to SERVLANT Forces, in order to provide necessary fleet support. A total of 4 MSTs TA-O's were made available and assigned to COMSERVLANT for operational control.

FOOTNOTES:

- 1 - CINCLANT 022018Z FEB 62
- 2 - CINCLANT 282250Z MAR 62
- 3 - CINCLANT 282220Z DEC 62
- 4 - SACLANT ser N-1201 of 5 OCT 62
- 5 - JCS 2421/85 of 7 NOV 62
- 6 - SACLANT ser N-1190 of 3 OCT 62
- 7 - JCS 2305/942 of 3 AUG 62

PART VI

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Organization - Personnel Augmentation

Of the seven officers and two enlisted billet increase approved by the JCS on 30 September 1961, six (6) officers and two (2) enlisted have reported. The officer personnel included a Major, USA, one Major, USMC, one Colonel, USAF, one Major, USAF, one Commander, USN, and one Lieutenant, USN. With the disestablishment of JTF-122 in October 1962, the Communication Division was further augmented by one Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, the former J-4 for JTF-122. These increases have permitted the establishment of a truly joint communication staff organization. In January 1963, a new recommended JTF will be submitted to JCS providing for a further increase of officer and enlisted billets. Also during the year, it was indicated clearly the need for an increased Communication staff to develop plans for various situations, as well as General War.

2. Joint Task Force FOUR

Planning continued throughout the year. Plans or portions thereof were tested during exercises BIG STEP and BLUEWATER. Personnel from the JTF-4 staff augmented the CINCLANT Joint Staff during the Cuban crisis.

3. Joint Task Force 122

Joint Task Force 122 conducted exercise QUICK KICK I to test Cuban Contingency Plans and these plans were further modified and refined. In October 1962, Headquarters JTF-122 was disestablished and its functions and personnel were absorbed by CINCLANT. The essential portion of Cuban plans developed by JTF-122 were adopted by CINCLANT with necessary modifications.

4. WHIPLASH and HIGH HEELS II

WHIPLASH,¹ a world wide CPX, was conducted in May. HIGH HEELS II,² a worldwide CPX of larger scope than WHIPLASH was conducted in September. As a result of lessons learned during these exercises, CINCLANT recommended the following action to improve communication effectiveness:³

- a. Reduce the number of addressees per message.
- b. Review and revise the criteria for assignment of precedence.
- c. Develop a more precise MINIMIZE policy.
- d. Increase the total capacity of our communication system.

5. National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA)

a. In March of 1961, the JCS directed implementation of the NECPA concept and CINCLANT was given the job of providing and operating the NECPA. The NORTHAMPTON was

designated as a NECPA ship, using the ships personnel on an interim basis to perform the JACE Staff functions. This continued until February 1962, at which time CINCLANT NECPA OPLAN¹ was issued, and JACE Battle Staff Teams were permanently assigned to NECPA on a rotational basis.

b. To reduce the ships vulnerability to electronics detection the primary peacetime system used for communications between NECPA, the AJCC, JCS and the CINCs is a UHF ship-shore transhorizon link, extended by landline system to AJCC. This UHF system is backed up with the LF, MF/HF capabilities of the NORTHAMPTON. The UHF transhorizon test facility at Dam Neck, Virginia is presently used as the shore station.

c. The ultimate NECPA program calls for four fixed and two mobile UHF stations located on the East Coast between Maine and Florida. The first of these new stations is due to be operable by March 1963.

d. Experience gained from 6 months of NECPA operations and a change to the communication Annex to the OPLAN. Change 1 to this plan was issued 14 October.

e. Frequency Clearance

The billet for a Joint Frequencies and Call Sign Officer was filled early in the year. The increased tempo of joint operations, especially those connected with the Cuban crisis created an ever increasing workload in the frequency area and brought to light certain weakness in current practice. CINCLANT's frequency management system is under review and revision. Increased personnel requirements for this vital area are reflected in the revised JTD being submitted.

7. Cuba

The Cuban crisis demonstrated the tremendous responsiveness and flexibility required of communications by contingency operations not involving actual hostilities. It was necessary to expand CINCLANT's communication capability several-fold in some areas in order to cope with the volume of high precedence, highly classified messages generated by the Cuban operation. This expansion was accomplished by emergency augmentation of personnel and equipment, activation of many new circuits in addition to those in EMC status, and by activation and deployment of mobile communication units (ATCUs). As a result of the lessons learned, CINCLANT's current communications posture is considerably improved over that existing prior to the Cuban crisis.

FOOTNOTES:

- 1 - CINCLANT OPORD 12-62
- 2 - CINCLANT OPORD 13-62
- 3 - CINCLANT ltr ser 90264/J625 of 25 Oct 1962
- 4 - CINCLANT OPLAN 149-62

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PART VIII

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDERS

1. Iceland

a. The Navy is the host service in Iceland.

b. RADM Robert B. Moore, USN, is Commander Iceland Defense Force (COMICE-DEFOR); Commander Barrier Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet; Island Commander Iceland (ISCOMICELAND); and Commander Fleet Air Keflavik (COMFAIRKEFLAVIK).

c. On 1 July 1962, the administrative control of the Air Force Squadron in Iceland was transferred from MATS to the Air Defense Command. The F-84D aircraft of the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron were replaced with 12 F-102 aircraft during September, October and November 1962. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

2. Azores

a. Brigadier General Eugene B. LeBarry, USAF, is Commander U. S. Forces Azores (COMUSFORAZ).

b. The U. S. - Portuguese agreement for U. S. base rights in the Azores expired on 31 December 1962. The negotiations to continue the U. S. base rights in the Azores are in progress. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

3. Antilles Defense Command

a. RADM Allen Smith, Jr., USN, is Commander Antilles Defense Command (COMANT-DEFCOM); Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier (COMCARIBSEAFRON) and Commander Fleet Air Caribbean (COMFAIRCARIB).

b. The granting of independence to Jamaica, Trinidad, and Tobago in 1962 marked the end of the Federation of the West Indies. U. S. base rights in the islands formerly comprising the West Indian Federation continues to be governed by the agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Federation of the West Indies signed on 10 February 1961.

COMANTDEFCOM's planning with Admiral Netherlands/Antilles for the combined defense of the Netherlands/Antilles continued through 1962. It is expected that the Combined Plan will be completed in early 1963 and forwarded to CINCLANT for approval. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

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